"We're at 82 to 85 percent manning levels in virtually every mission area," Welsh said during a discussion Tuesday at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.
Is this a numerator problem or a denominator problem?
Nine Air Force officers lost their commands because they failed to understand incentives and unintended consequences.
An article on DoD Buzz about the Air Force's next-generation aircraft states:
Meantime, the operational costs of the F-35 are unlikely to affect how many of the aircraft the service intends to buy, Donley said.
The cost of flying the F-35 “will be slightly higher than the F-16, there’s no doubt about that in my mind,” he said. “I don’t think there’s a link there between projected operational costs and how many we’re going to buy.”
How can there not be a link between what an aircraft costs to operate and the quantity that the Air Force will purchase? Isn't the cost of ownership a key component of fleet composition and size?
Today, ACC announced that they will reduce flying hours by approximately 45,000 between now and Oct 1st.
In the announcement, ACC states:
Although each weapon system is unique, on average aircrews lose currency to fly combat missions within 90 to 120 days of not flying. It generally takes 60 to 90 days to conduct the training needed to return aircrews to mission-ready status, and the time and cost associated with that retraining increases the longer that crews stay on the ground.
It is striking how sensitive ACC is to reductions in flying hour availability. I know of no human capital investment that is more costly and depreciates faster than fighter pilot currency.
Simulator training is used to assist in maintaining currency. What other means should the Air Force consider to reduce the cost and minimize the depreciation of this skill set?